Abstract. The input is a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E) where each vertex u ∈ A ∪ B ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. This is the same as an instance of the stable marriage problem with incomplete lists. A matching M * is said to be popular if there is no matching M such that more vertices are better off in M than in M * . Any stable matching of G is popular, however such a matching is a minimum cardinality popular matching. We consider the problem of computing a maximum cardinality popular matching in G. It has very recently been shown that when preference lists have ties, the problem of determining if a given instance admits a popular matching or not is NP-complete. When preference lists are strict, popular matchings always exist, however the complexity of computing a maximum cardinality popular matching was unknown. In this paper we give a simple characterization of popular matchings when preference lists are strict and a sufficient condition for a maximum cardinality popular matching. We then show an O(mn 0 ) algorithm for computing a maximum cardinality popular matching, where m = |E| and n 0 = min(|A|, |B|).
Introduction
Our input is a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E) where each vertex ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. Each vertex u ∈ A ∪ B seeks to be assigned to one of its neighbors and u's preference is given by the ordering in u's preference list. Preference lists can be incomplete, which means that a vertex may be adjacent to only some of the vertices on the other side. (We assume without loss of generaility that a belongs to b's list if and only if b belongs to a's list, for any a and b.) Note that this is the same as an instance of the stable marriage problem with incomplete lists and it is customary to call the two sides of the graph men and women respectively.
Let V denote the entire vertex set A ∪ B and let |V | = n and |E| = m. We assume that no vertex is isolated, so m ≥ n/2.
A matching M is a set of edges no two of which share an endpoint. An edge (u, v) is said to be a blocking edge for a matching M if by being matched to each other, both u and v are better off than their respective assignments in M: that is, u is either unmatched in M or prefers v to M(u) and similarly, v is either unmatched in M or prefers u to M (v) . A matching that admits no blocking edges is called a stable matching. It is known that every instance G admits a stable matching [9] and such a matching can be computed in linear time by a straightforward generalization [5] of the Gale/Shapley algorithm [3] for complete lists.
Popular Matchings
For any two matchings M and M ′ , we say that vertex u prefers M to M ′ if u is better off in M than in M ′ (i.e., u is either matched in M and unmatched in M ′ or matched in both and prefers M(u) to M ′ (u)). We say that M is more popular than M ′ , denoted by M ≻ M ′ , if the number of vertices that prefer M to M ′ is more than the number of vertices that prefer M ′ to M.
Definition 1. A matching M is popular if there is no matching that is more popular than M.
Popularity is an attractive notion of optimality as a majority vote cannot force a migration from a popular matching. Gärdenfors [4] introduced the notion of popularity in the context of stable matchings. Popular matchings have been studied extensively during the last few years [1, 11, 10, 8, 13, 12, 7] in the case where only vertices of A have preferences while vertices of B have no preferences. Thus each edge e = (a, b) in G has a rank associated with it (the rank that a assigns to b). There are simple examples in the one-sided preference lists domain that admit no popular matching. In the world of two-sided strict preference lists, popular matchings always exist since stable matchings always exist and every stable matching is popular, as we observe in the next paragraph.
When comparing a stable matching S to any matching M, note that for any edge e ∈ M, both the endpoints of e cannot prefer M to S -if they do, then it contradicts the stability of S. Hence if one endpoint of e prefers M to S, then the other has to prefer S to M. Thus the number of votes in favor of M is at most the number of votes in favor of S, hence M cannot be more popular than S. So popular matchings always exist in the world of two-sided strict preference lists. But not all popular matchings are stable as shown by this simple example: let A = {a 1 , a 2 } and B = {b 1 , b 2 } and let the preference lists be as shown in Fig. 1 . In this instance, the matching {(a 1 , b 1 )} is the only stable matching, while {(a 1 , b 2 ), (a 2 , b 1 )} is popular but unstable. Thus the containment {stable matchings} ⊆ { popular matchings} could be strict.
Our problem
Given G = (A ∪ B,E) with two-sided preference lists, a stable matching has usually been considered the optimal way of matching the vertices. The fact that there can be no blocking edge in a stable matching is a very strong condition and it is known ( [5] , Section 4.5.2) that all stable matchings in G = (A ∪ B,E) have the same size and match exactly the same set of vertices, let U denote this subset of V . We show in Section 2 that every popular matching has to match all the vertices in U and a stable matching is a minimum cardinality popular matching.
There are many problems, where it is desirable to match more than just the vertices in U, for instance, in allocating training positions to trainees or projects to students, where the total absence of blocking edges is not necessary and a more relaxed definition of stability suffices. Thus at one end of the spectrum, we have stable matchings where no blocking edge is permitted and whose size is the minimum among all popular matchings and at the other end, we have maximum cardinality matchings that are not stable in any sense, since the preferences of vertices play no role here. What we seek is a matching that is somewhere in between these two extremes -we are willing to weaken to some extent the notion of stability for the sake of obtaining a larger matching.
The notion of popularity captures this slightly weakened notion of stability: blocking edges are permitted in a popular matching M, nevertheless M has overall stability since there is no matching where more vertices are better off than in M. Hence in problems where we are ready to substitute stability with popularity, for the sake of increasing the size of the resulting matching, what we seek is a maximum cardinality popular matching. In other words, we want a largest matching M in G such that there is no matching where more vertices are better off than in M. There are instances (as in our example in Fig. 1 ) where a maximum cardinality popular matching can be twice as large as a stable matching.
Our main result is that a maximum cardinality popular matching in G = (A ∪ B,E) can be computed in O(mn 0 ) time, where m = |E| and n 0 = min(|A|, |B|). We now give an overview of how we obtain this result and other results here. The following definition will be useful to us: Definition 2. For any u ∈ A ∪ B and neighbors x and y of u, define u's vote between x and y as:
Let M be any matching in G. Label every edge e = (u, v) in E \ M by the pair (α e , β e ), where α e = vote u (v, M(u)) and β e = vote v (u, M(v)), i.e., α e is u's vote for v vs. M(u) and β e is v's vote for u vs. M (v) . Note that for any vertex u, if u is unmatched in M, then vote u (v, M(u)) = 1 for any neighbor v of u, since every vertex prefers being matched with any of its neighbors to being unmatched.
Any path/cycle ρ in G where alternate edges in ρ belong to M is called an alternating path/cycle with respect to M. For an alternating path ρ, if the endpoints of ρ are unmatched in M, then ρ is called an augmenting path wrt M.
Theorem 1 gives a simple characterization of popular matchings in a graph G = (V, E) with strict preference lists. Note that this theorem also holds for non-bipartite graphs with strict preference lists, referred to as the roommates problem; however popular matchings need not always exist in the roommates problem. We prove Theorem 1 in Section 2. While a stable matching forbids all (1, 1) edges, it is condition (iii) that allows (1, 1) edges in a popular matching M -at most one (1, 1) edge can be allowed in certain alternating paths in G M . In addition to conditions (i)-(iii), suppose M also satisfies the following condition:
(iv) There is no augmenting path with respect to M in G M .
We will show in Section 2 that such a matching M has to be a maximum cardinality popular matching. Note that unlike conditions (i)-(iii) that are both sufficient and necessary for a popular matching, condition (iv) is not necessary for a maximum cardinality popular matching (Section 2 has such an example). In fact, it is not clear if there always exists a matching that satisfies conditions (i)-(iv). We show an algorithm in Section 3 that always constructs such a matching in a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E) with strict preference lists.
Our approach. Suppose we partition the vertex set V = A ∪ B into L and R, i.e., L∪ R = G, and reorganize the graph G by placing all the vertices of L on the left and all the vertices of R on the right. Note that L and R need not be independent sets. Let M be a matching in L × R, i.e., every edge of M has one endpoint in L and the other endpoint in R. (1) There is no edge marked
to a or both. Property (2) of goodness states that for every e in L × L, each endpoint of e prefers its partner in M to the other endpoint of e. Theorem 2 proved in Section 2 establishes the link between a good matching and the matching that we seek.
Theorem 2. If M is a matching that is good with respect to some partition (L, R) of V and M is R-perfect, then M satisfies conditions (i)-(iv).
Given a partition (L, R) of V , to construct a matching that satisfies property (1) of goodness is easy: the Gale/Shapley algorithm on the edge set restricted to E ∩ (L × R) where vertices in L propose and those in R dispose, yields a matching M ⊆ L × R that has no edge marked (1, 1) in L × R. To ensure that M obeys property (2), we need to come up with a suitable L ⊂ V . Additionally, M needs to be R-perfect so that we can use Theorem 2. We show the following theorem in Section 3. Finally, we show a linear time algorithm that is based on Theorem 1 to test if a given matching M in G = (A ∪ B,E) is popular or not.
Related Results
Abraham et al. [1] considered the popular matchings problem in the domain of one-sided preference lists; they described efficient algorithms to determine if a given instance admits a popular matching or not and if so, to compute one with maximum cardinality. For one-sided preference lists (both for strict lists and for lists with ties), they gave a structural characterisation of instances that admit popular matchings. The work in [1] on one-sided popular matchings was generalized to the capacitated version by Manlove and Sng [11] , the weighted version by Mestre [14] , and Mahdian studied random popular matchings [10] . Kavitha and Nasre [8] as well as McDermind and Irving [13] independently studied the problem of computing an optimal popular matching for strict instances where the notion of optimality is specified as a part of the input. For instances that do not admit popular matchings, McCutchen [12] considered the problem of computing a least unpopular matching and showed this problem to be NP-hard, while Kavitha, Mestre, and Nasre [7] showed the existence of popular mixed matchings and efficient algorithms for computing them.
Gärdenfors [4] , who originated the notion of popular matchings, considered this problem in the domain of two-sided preference lists. When ties are allowed in preference lists here, it has recently been shown by Biró, Irving, and Manlove [2] that the problem of computing an arbitrary popular matching in the stable marriage problem is NP-hard. The complexity of the maximum cardinality popular matching problem in the stable marriage problem when preference lists are strict (recall that the popular matchings always exist here) was not known so far and we answer this question here.
Structural Results
Characterization of Popular Matchings. In this section we first prove Theorem 1 and then show that conditions (i)-(iv) imply a maximum cardinality popular matching. First we show that conditions (i)-(iii) imply popularity and vice-versa in the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose M is any matching in G that satisfies conditions (i)-(iii) given in Theorem 1. Let M ′ be any matching in G. Define ∆(M ′ , M) as follows: We need to compute 
, so we need to consider only those components ρ that contain two or more vertices. Each such ρ in M ⊕ M ′ is either a cycle or a path; also
Let ρ be a cycle. Since every vertex in ρ is matched by M ′ , we have
where
Note that for every edge e ∈ ρ, (α e , β e ) is either (1, 1) or (−1, 1) or (1, −1). But we are given that M satisfies condition (i) of Theorem 1. Hence there is no (1, 1) edge in ρ. Thus for each edge e ∈ ρ ∩ M ′ , α e + β e = 0 and hence
Let ρ be a path. Suppose both the endpoints of ρ are matched in M ′ . Then Eqn.
(1) holds here. Since an endpoint of ρ is free in M, by condition (ii) of Theorem 1, we have no (1, 1) edge wrt M in ρ. Thus for each edge e ∈ ρ ∩ M ′ , α e + β e = 0 and hence ∑ e∈ρ∩M ′ α e + β e = 0.
-Suppose exactly one endpoint of ρ is matched in M ′ . Then
since there is one vertex that is matched in M but not in M ′ and that vertex prefers M to M ′ . Here too an endpoint of ρ is free in M, and so by condition (ii), we have no (1, 1) edge wrt M in ρ.
Thus for each edge e ∈ ρ ∩ M ′ , α e + β e = 0 and hence
since there are two vertices that are matched in M but not in M ′ and those two vertices prefer M to M ′ . We use condition (iii) here. There can be at most one (1, 1) edge wrt M in ρ. Thus except for at most one edge e in ρ ∩ M ′ , we have α e + β e = 0. So
We will now show the converse. That is, if M does not satisfy one or more of conditions (i)-(iii) of Theorem 1, then M is not popular.
• Suppose M does not satisfy property (i). So there is a cycle C in G M that contains a (1, 1) edge wrt M. It is easy to see that the matching M ⊕C is more popular than M.
• Suppose M does not satisfy property (ii). Then there is an alternating path p wrt M, one of whose endpoints is unmatched in M and p contains a (1, 1) edge. It is again easy to see that M ⊕ p is more popular than M.
• Suppose M does not satisfy property (iii). Then there is an alternating path p wrt M that contains two or more (1, 1) edges wrt M. It is again easy to see that M ⊕ p is more popular than M.
This finishes the proof of Theorem 1. ⊓ ⊔
Lemma 1. Any stable matching is a minimum cardinality popular matching in G = (A ∪ B,E).
Proof. Let S be a stable matching in G. We know that S is popular. Let R be any matching such that |R| < |S|. Then one of the components of R ⊕ S is a path p that is augmenting with respect to R, i.e., both the endpoints of p are unmatched in R. Since the endpoints of p prefer S to R, we have
where α e = vote u (v, S(u)) and β e = vote v (u, S(v)). The main observation here is that since S is stable, no edge of R can be a (1, 1) edge. Thus for each e in p ∩ R, we have α e + β e ≤ 0. Hence
Thus no matching of size smaller than S can be popular. So S is a minimum cardinality popular matching in G.
⊓ ⊔
Recall that it is known ( [5] , Section 4.5.2) that all stable matchings in G = (A ∪ B,E) have the same size and match exactly the same set of vertices, let U denote this subset of vertices.
Corollary 1. Every popular matching in G has to match all vertices in U.
Proof. Let R be a matching that does not match some v ∈ U. Then R ⊕ S, where S is stable, contains a path p, where v is an endpoint of p. Since no edge of R can be a (1, 1) edge wrt S, it is easy to see that ∑ u∈p vote u (R(u), S(u)) ≤ −1, in other words, R ⊕ p is more popular than R. ⊓ ⊔ The sufficient condition. Recall condition (iv) stated in Section 1: There is no augmenting path with respect to M in G M . We now show that a matching that satisfies conditions (i)- (iv) is what we seek.
Theorem 4. If a popular matching M satisfies condition (iv), then M is a maximum cardinality popular matching in G.
Proof. Since M is a popular matching, we know that M satisfies conditions (i)-(iii) of Theorem 1. Let Q be another matching in G and let |Q| > |M|. So Q ⊕ M contains an augmenting path p wrt M. We will show using condition (iv) that Q ⊕ p is more popular than Q. Thus no matching of size larger than |M| can be popular. Hence it follows that M is a maximum cardinality popular matching in G. 
where the first term 2(t − 2) counts the total number of (1, 1) edges possible over p 1 , . . . , p t and the second term 2(t − 1) counts all the (−1, −1) edges in p (one such edge between p i and p i+1 ,
Note that condition (iv) is not necessary for a popular matching to be one of maximum cardinality, as shown by the following example. The matching S = {(a 1 , b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 )} is the only stable matching in the instance in Fig. 2 and this is also a maximum cardinality popular matching. However there is an augmenting path a 3 -b 1 -a 1 -b 3 wrt S in G S . However, there is another maximum cardinality popular matching M = {(a 1 , b 2 ), (a 2 , b 1 )} that admits no augmenting path in G M .
An example of a stable roommates instance where no popular matching satisfies condition (iv) is given in Fig. 3 . Note that this instance is the same as the example in Fig. 2 with two extra edges: (a 2 , a 3 ) and (b 2 , b 3 ), where x 2 is x 3 's second choice and x 3 is x 2 's third choice, for x = a, b. This instance admits a stable matching S = {(a 1 , b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 )} indicated in bold in Fig. 3 . This is the only popular matching here. b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 )}.
In other words, we have
and S is the only popular matching here. However there is an augmenting path b 3 -a 1 -b 1 -a 3 wrt S in G S . Thus no popular matching in this instance satisfies condition (iv). However as we shall see in Section 3, in the stable marriage problem (i.e., G is a bipartite graph), there is always a matching in G = (A ∪ B,E) that satisfies
We also show an instance G = (A ∪ B,E) below whose stable matching S has size 4 and the size of a maximum cardinality popular matching is 6. However there is no popular matching in G of size 5. The preference lists of the vertices are given below. 
Fig. 4. The only stable marriage here is
There are 4 augmenting paths wrt the stable matching S in G S . These are:
It is easy to see that none of S ⊕ p i is popular, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. However S ⊕ p 1 ⊕ p 2 , which is { (a 1 , b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 ), (a 3 , b 3 ), (a 4 , b 4 ), (a 5 , b 5 ), (a 6 , b 6 )}, is popular. Thus there is a popular matching of size 6, however there is no popular matching of size 5, but there is one (the matching S) of size 4. That is, there are several augmenting paths with respect to S in G S and for every augmenting path ρ, the matching S ⊕ ρ is unpopular. So an augmenting path-type technique to find a matching that satisfies conditions (i)-(iv) does not look promising and we need a new idea.
Good Matchings
Recall the definition of a good matching (Definition 3 from Section 1). Let M ⊆ L × R be a matching that is good with respect to (L, R), where L∪ R = V . We will now prove Theorem 2 that a good matching that is R-perfect satisfies conditions (i)-(iv).
Proof of Theorem 2. Let M be a matching that is good with respect to some partition (L, R) of V and suppose M is R-perfect. Consider the graph G M . By property (2) of goodness, the set L of vertices is independent in G M . We now show that conditions (i)-(iv) are obeyed by M. 
Condition (i)
. Let C be an alternating cycle with respect toM in G M . Since M ⊆ L × R, every edge in C ∩ M is
Condition (ii)
has to be in L, and u 3 is in R since u 2 has no neighbor in L and so on. Thus p ⊆ L × R. Hence by property (1) of goodness of M, condition (ii) is satisfied.
Condition (iii).
Let p = u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u k be any alternating path with respect to M in G M . We need to show that p has at most one (1, 1) edge wrt M in G M . Since it is only edges outside M that get labeled, we can assume without loss of generality that (u 0 , u 1 ) / ∈ M. If u 0 ∈ L, then the same argument as in the earlier case (which showed that condition (ii) is satisfied) shows that p ⊆ L × R and so there is no (1, 1) edge in p.
So let us assume that u 0 ∈ R. Since there are R × R edges in G M , there are two cases: Case 1: Every odd indexed vertex (i.e., for every i, the vertex u 2i+1 ) is in L. Then the entire path uses only L × R edges, hence there is no (1, 1) edge in p.
Case 2: Not every odd indexed vertex is in L. Let u 2 j+1 be the first odd indexed vertex that is in R. That is, the edge (u 2 j , u 2 j+1 ) ∈ R × R. Then u 2 j+2 , which is M(u 2 j+1 ) has to be in L. Since there are no L × L edges in G M , thereafter every odd indexed vertex u 2k−1 of p is in R and u 2k = M(u 2k−1 ) has to be in L, so every even indexed vertex in p after u 2 j+1 is in L. Hence there can be only one R × R edge, which is (u 2 j , u 2 j+1 ), in p. Thus p has at most one (1, 1) edge and condition (iii) is satisfied.
Condition (iv). Suppose there exists an augmenting path
that is, the vertices u 0 and u 2k+1 are unmatched in M. Since M is R-perfect, u 0 ∈ L and since there are no L × L edges, u 1 which is u 0 's neighbor has to be in R. So the vertex u 2 = M(u 1 ) is in L, and the vertex u 3 which is u 2 's neighbor has to be in R, and u 4 = M(u 3 ) has to be in L, and so on. That is, every even indexed vertex u 2i is in L and every odd indexed vertex u 2i+1 is in R. Thus u 2k+1 (the other endpoint of p) has to be in R, which contradicts that M is R-perfect, since u 2k+1 is unmatched in M. Hence there exists no augmenting path wrt M in G M .
This finishes the proof of Theorem 2. ⊓ ⊔
The Algorithm
Our job now is to find a partition (L, R) and a matching M that is good wrt this partition and which is R-perfect. The vertices in R can be viewed as the "sought-after" vertices since they are all matched in M and the vertices in L are the vertices that seek partners in R.
For convenience, we will refer to the elements of A and B as men and women, respectively. Let A 0 ⊂ A and B 0 ⊂ B be the sets of those men and women respectively, that are unmatched in any stable matching of G = (A ∪ B,E) . Recall that every stable matching in G leaves the same
It is easy to construct a matching M 1 that is good with respect to the partition (L 1 , R 1 ): let M 1 be the matching obtained when vertices of L 1 propose to the vertices of R 1 and vertices of R 1 dispose. That is, we run the Gale/Shapley algorithm on the "bipartite" graph obtained by placing L 1 on the left and R 1 on the right and the edge set restricted to E ∩ (L 1 × R 1 ).
We now show that M 1 is good with respect to (L 1 , R 1 ). Property (1) of goodness holds by the very nature of the proposal-disposal algorithm and property (2) of the goodness of any matching M 1 ⊆ L 1 × R 1 is vacuously true, since L 1 is an independent set in G, and hence in G M . If M 1 is R 1 -perfect, then we are done. Otherwise we need to define a new L and show that we have made some progress.
Our algorithm is given below. We assume without loss of generality that |B| ≤ |A|. Recall that we want our matching M to satisfy the following:
-M is good with respect to some partition (L, R) and -M is R-perfect. 
Algorithm 1 Input: G = (A ∪ B,E) with strict preference lists
L i , R i ). 6. if M i is R i -perfect then return M i . 7. let A i ⊂ A be the set of men in R i who are unmatched in M i . 8. set L ′ i = L i ∪ A i and R ′ i = V \ L ′ i . 9. compute a matching M ′ i by the proposal-disposal algorithm on (L ′ i , R ′ i ). 10. if M ′ i is R ′ i -perfect then return M ′ i .
let B i be the set of vertices in R ′
i left unmatched by M ′ i . {we will show that all these vertices have to be women}
end while
We use the Gale/Shapley proposal-disposal algorithm several times in Algorithm 1. This proposal-disposal algorithm on (L, R) for any L ⊂ A ∪ B and R = V \ L is given in Fig. 5 . This subroutine describes the Gale/Shapley algorithm on the "bipartite" graph obtained by placing L on the left and R on the right and the edge set restricted to E ∩ (L × R); here vertices of L propose to the vertices of R and vertices of R dispose.
while there is some u ∈ L unmatched in M who has not yet been rejected by all its neighbors in R do -u proposes to its most preferred neighbor v ∈ R that has not rejected u. Note that in this subroutine even if there is an edge (u, w) ∈ L × L such that w is u's most preferred neighbor in G that has not yet rejected u, u ignores w and proposes to its most preferred neighbor in R that has not yet rejected u. This is because the above algorithm runs on the edge set E ∩ (L × R), so edges of L × L play no part at all.
Since every unmatched ℓ ∈ L proposes in decreasing order of preference and every r ∈ R improves in the choice of its partner whenever M(r) gets reassigned, Claim 1 stated below is straightforward. This will be used in our analysis. 
Claim 1 If M is the matching returned by the Gale/Shapley proposal-disposal algorithm on (L, R), then there is no edge (ℓ, r) in L ×

Lemma 3. The number of while-loop iterations in Algorithm 1 is at most |B|.
Proof. To show that termination has to happen within the first |B| iterations is simple. This is because if termination does not happen in the
(otherwise termination would have happened in the i-th iteration). Once a woman moves to the left side of the graph, she never moves back to the right side again. Thus there is an iteration k, 
For the 4 vertices a 2n−1 , b 2n−1 , a 2n , and b 2n , the preference lists are:
In the above instance a 1 ), (a 2n , b 1 ), (b 2n , a 3 ) } is obtained. Then the unmatched men a 2 , a 4 , a 5 , . . . , a 2n−1 move to the left from the right and make their proposals and the matching a 1 ) } is obtained. The only vertex unmatched on the right is b 4 . So we set L 3 = L 2 ∪ {b 4 } and start the third round.
-At the end of the i-th round, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, the set L i+1 will be set to L i ∪ {b 2i }. In the n-th round the set a 1 ), (b 4 , a 3 ) , . . . , (b 2n−2 , a 2n−3 ), (b 2n , a 2n−1 )}. The unmatched men on the right are a 2 , a 4 , . . . , a 2n−2 . When these move to the left and propose, the resulting matching is
All the vertices on the right are matched in M ′ n , hence the algorithm returns this matching in the n-th iteration.
Correctness of Algorithm 1
We will show in this section that our algorithm maintains the following invariants:
For all the matchings M i and M ′ i computed in our algorithm, property (1) of goodness is obvious since these matchings are obtained by the proposal-disposal algorithm between the left side and the right side (see Claim 1). What we need to show now is that property (2) of goodness is also obeyed by them.
We know that M 1 is good with respect to (L 1 , R 1 ). This is because L 1 is an independent set and so property (2) of goodness is vacuously true. The next lemma shows that M ′ 1 also obeys property (2) of goodness.
is an independent set, the vertex a has to be in A 1 . Observe that every vertex of A 1 will be matched in M ′ 1 by virtue of the fact that the other vertices in L ′ 1 comprise the set of vertices unmatched in any stable matching of G. It is easy to see that a ∈ A 1 gets a partner in M ′ 1 that is at least as good as S(a), where S is the stable matching that results from vertices in A proposing to vertices in B.
Recall that B 0 is the set of women unmatched in S, so a regards S(a) better than any neighbor in
This finishes the proof of the lemma.
⊓ ⊔
This proves that M ′ 1 is good with respect to (L ′ 1 , R ′ 1 ). Now consider any i ≥ 2. We assume by induction hypothesis on i that the matching By induction hypothesis, we know that
It is easy to see that any a ∈ A 0 gets at least as good a partner in M i as in
-The presence of B i−1 in L i does not hurt the men in A 0 when they propose to women in R i because B i−1 is the set of women who were unmatched on the right when the men in A 0 were proposing in ( ⊓ ⊔
We will now show that for any
in Lemmas 6 and 7, respectively. 
Testing for popularity
In this section we show a linear time algorithm to test if a matching in a stable marriage instance G = (A ∪ B,E) with strict preference lists is popular or not. This problem was previously considered in [2] where an O(m √ n) algorithm was shown for this problem. Here we use Theorem 1 to design our linear time algorithm.
Our algorithm first labels each edge
If there exists no edge labeled (1, 1) in E \ M, then M is stable, hence popular. So let us assume that edges labeled (1, 1) exist. We first delete from G all edges labeled (−1, −1) to form the graph G M . Theorem 1 tells us if any of (a), (b), (c) given below is present in G M , then M is unpopular; otherwise it is popular.
(a) an alternating cycle that contains an edge labeled (1, 1) (b) an alternating path starting from an unmatched vertex that contains an edge labeled (1, 1) (c) an alternating path that contains two or more edges labeled (1, 1) .
So what we need to do in our algorithm is to check if (a), (b), or (c) exists in G M . We build a tree similar to a Hungarian tree in G M . (A Hungarian tree is typically used to find an augmenting path wrt a given matching.) Our Algorithm. Our algorithm to check for the existence of (a), (b), or (c) in G M is given below.
1. Mark the endpoints of all the edges labeled (1, 1) in G M . 2. We build a tree or more appropriately, a layered graph, using edges of G M as follows:
-all the marked women are at level 0 -the men matched to level 0 vertices are in level 1 -the new neighbors of the level 1 vertices are level 2 vertices (i.e., the women in level 0 do not get repeated here) -the men matched to the women in level 2 are level 3 vertices -the neighbors of the level 3 vertices not seen so far are level 4 vertices, and so on. Note that for any vertex u in this tree, there is an alternating path that starts with a matched edge from a level 0 vertex to u. 3. If either a marked man or a unmatched woman is encountered in the above tree, then return "unpopular". 4. Build another such tree in G M where all the marked men are in level 0, the vertices matched to them are in level 1, their new neighbors are in level 2, and so on. If an unmatched man is encountered in this tree, then return "unpopular". 5. Return "popular".
Claim 3 If a marked man is encountered in Step 3, then this is evidence of (a) or (c).
Proof. Let x be the marked man encountered in this tree. Observe that men are reached through matched edges in this tree. Thus there is an alternating path starting with a matched edge from a marked woman (call this vertex y) and ending with a matched edge in x. Both y and x are marked. Thus x has an edge labeled (1, 1) incident to it, so does y.
If it is the same (1, 1) edge that is incident to both x and y (i.e., there is a (1, 1) edge between x and y), then this is an alternating cycle with a (1, 1) edge. So suppose the (1, 1) edges incident on x and y are different. Since G is bipartite, x and y do not have a common neighbor, thus the (1, 1) edge incident on x, followed by the alternating path between x and y, followed by the (1, 1) edge incident on y is an alternating path with two (1, 1) edges.
⊓ ⊔
The following claims are straightforward.
Claim 4 If an unmatched woman in encountered in
Step 3, then this is evidence of (b).
Claim 5 If an unmatched man is encountered in Step 4, then this is evidence of (b).
Thus it follows from Claims 3, 4, and 5 that whenever the algorithm returns "unpopular", the matching M is unpopular. Now we need to show that if the algorithm returns "popular", then M is indeed popular. If an alternating cycle with a (1, 1) edge or an alternating path with two (1, 1) edges exists in G M , then a marked man has to be encountered in Step 3 of our algorithm.
Lemma 8.
Proof. Suppose G M has either an alternating cycle with a (1, 1) edge or an alternating path with two (1, 1) edges in G M . Let ρ be a shortest such cycle or path. If ρ is an alternating cycle, then let x 1 , y 1 , . . . , x k , y k (the x's are men and the y's are women) denote ρ \ {e}, where e is the edge labeled (1, 1) in ρ. If ρ is an alternating path with two (1, 1) edges in G M , then the first and last edges of ρ are (1, 1) edges and let x 1 , y 1 , . . . , x k , y k denote ρ after removing these two (1, 1) edges.
In both cases (whether ρ is a cycle or a path), the vertices x 1 and y k are marked. The vertex y k , being a marked woman, is present in level 0 in our tree. The vertex x k , being the vertex matched to y k , is present in level 1, the vertex y k−1 being a neighbor of x k−1 has to be in level 2 (y k−1 cannot be in level 0 since that would contradict ρ being a shortest such cycle/path), and so on. Thus the vertex x 1 , which is a marked man, will be encountered in level 2k − 1.
⊓ ⊔ Proof. Let ρ be a shortest alternating path in G M starting from an unmatched woman that contains a (1, 1) edge. Since the first edge of ρ (incident on an unmatched vertex) and the last edge of ρ (a (1, 1) edge) are unmatched edges, ρ is of odd length. Let ρ = y 0 , x 1 , y 1 , . . . , x k , y k , x k+1 , where y 0 is the unmatched woman and (y k , x k+1 ) is the (1, 1) edge. Hence y k has to be marked and being a marked woman, it has to be present in level 0. The argument now is similar to the proof of Lemma 8. The vertex x k is matched to y k , so x k is in level 1 and so on, thus the vertex y 0 , an unmatched woman, will be encountered in level 2k.
⊓ ⊔
We can symmetrically show that if G M has an alternating path starting from an unmatched man that contains a (1, 1) edge, then a marked man has to be encountered in Step 4 of our algorithm. Thus it follows that if the algorithm reaches Step 5, then G M has none of (a), (b), (c). The popularity of M now follows from Theorem 1. It is easy to see that our algorithm takes linear time. Thus we can conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Given a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E) with 2-sided strict preference lists and a matching M in G, we can test if M is popular in G in linear time.
Conclusions and Open problems. We gave a simple characterization of popular matchings in any instance G (not necessarily bipartite) with two-sided preference lists that are strictly ordered. We also showed a sufficient condition for a popular matching to be one of maximum cardinality. We introduced the notion of a "good" matching wrt a partition (L, R) of the vertex set and showed that such a matching that is also R-perfect has to be a maximum cardinality popular matching. For a bipartite graph G = (A ∪B, E), we gave an efficient algorithm to compute such a matching.
We also showed a linear time algorithm to test if a given matching in G = (A ∪ B,E) is popular.
For non-bipartite G with strict preference lists (also called the roommates problem), the complexity of determining if G admits a popular matching or not is an open problem. For roommates instances that admit stable matchings (given a roommates instance, there is a linear time algorithm in [6] that computes a stable matching if it exists), there is no polynomial time algorithm known for computing a maximum cardinality popular matching. For testing a matching M in a roommates instance for popularity, an O(m nα(n, m) log 3/2 n) algorithm was given in [2] . This algorithm uses a maximum weight matching algorithm, it is an open problem to extend our algorithm in Section 3.2 to the non-bipartite case.
